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CORPORATIONS: THE THREE-STOCKHOLDERS
REQUIREMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA
IN Lester Bros. v. Pope Realty & Ins. Co.,' the defendant-corporation
was sued for debts which arose while its shares were held by only two
stockholders. The shares held by one of three original stockholders
had been purchased by the corporation and had not been resold. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina, basing its decision on the earlier
case of Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co.,2 held that, when the
number of stockholders of the corporation fell below three, the corpora-
tion became dormant and the two remaining stockholders thus became
personally liable on the obligations incurred during this period of
dormancy.
The court had held in the Park Terrace decision that the pattern of
corporate legislation embodied in the North Carolina statutes required
that each corporation have a minimum of three stockholders.' This
-o N.C. 565, 1o9 S.E.2d 263 (959).
S243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.zd 584" (1956).
Eighteen months prior to the suit, all the stock of the Park Terrace corporation
was purchased by an individual. As part of the terms of the sale, the buyer signed an
agreement to accept the apartment house owned by the corporation "as is" and to
release any right to sue because of poor workmanship or defective materials. The
buyer, who was the sole stockholder of the corporation, did not bring the suit5 instead,
the corporation sued the builders of the apartment house for improper workmanship
and use of defective materials.
Park Terrace first came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the lower court's
overruling of the defendant's motion to bring the buyer into the suit as the real party
in interest. The majority of the court ruled that tie buyer was not the real party in
interest and that, because of the separate entity of the corporation, it could bring the
action even though the sole stockholder of the corporation had given a release to the
sellers for the very cause of action on which the corporation was now suing.
Justice Bobbitt, dissenting, stated that the separate entity theory was merely a legal
fiction and should be disregarded by the courts anytime that recognition of the separate
entity would be inequitable. The buyer was attempting to use the separate entity of
the corporation to bring indirectly an action that he could not bring directly. In view
of the devious use of the corporate entity, the court would have been justified in refusing
to recognize the separate entity of the corporation and in requiring that the buyer and
sole stockholder be joined as a party.
When the case came before the Supreme Court, following a judgment for the plain-
tiff, the court reversed and remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial. The
Supreme Court overruled its previous decision on the defendant's motion, and held that
the sole stockholder was the real party in interest. The court arrived at this conclusion
after examining several of the North Carolina statutes. It was then stated:
"It requires three or more persons to obtain a certificate of incorporation, G.S. 55-z,
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holding is contrary to the decisions in most other jurisdictions4 and to
the rule propounded by leading authorities.' As has been pointed out
by numerous decisions, the number three has no magic qualities in the
corporate scheme. The number of stockholders might as readily be
one or two.
6
At the time the Park Terrace case was decided, the North Carolina
legislature was in the process of revising the state's corporation statutes.
The Park Terrace decision precipitated the enactment of section 55-3.1
of the General Statutes, which provides that a corporation's capacity to
act as a corporation is not affected when less than three persons acquire
all of its stock. Furthermore, this statute also provided that it should
operate retroactively. When these facts were drawn to the attention of
the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Pope Realty case, it held that
the retroactive feature of the statute was unconstitutional because "when
plaintiff dealt with Pope the law of this State as declared in the Park
Terrace case made him individually liable for the debts he thus created.
and the certificate of incorporation must be signed by a majority of applicants. If one
dies before the organization of the corporation, some other person must be designated
in his place and stead. G.S. 55-7. The corporation must have at least three directors
who manage the affairs of the corporation, G.S. 55-48, and three officers, provided any
two offices may be held by one person. So there must be at least two officers. G.S. 55-
49. Real estate of the corporation may be conveyed by its president and two stock-
holders or by the president, attested by the secretary. G.S. 55-40. Three stockholders
may call a meeting of the corporation, G.S. 55-6, and a majority of stockholders may
dissolve the corporation, G.S. 55-121.
"Thus the concept that a corporation is a combination of three or more persons who
may operate as a legal entity when chartered so to do threads its way through the cited
and practically every other section of our law on corporations. General Statutes, ch. 55.
No lesser number will suffice.
"Not possessing the managerial agencies--stockholders, directors, or officers-con-
templated by statute, it can no longer act as a corporation. Its decisions are the de-
cisions of the single stockholder, and its action is his action." Park Terrace, Inc. v.
Phoenix Indem. Co., 243 N.C. 595, 597, 91 S.E.2d 584, 586 (.956).
'Majestic Theater Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F.zd 991 (D. Conn. 1930);
Bachrach v. Allen, 239 Mass. 272, I3 N.E. 857 (i92,); Rough v. Breitung, 117 Mich.
48, 75 N.W. 147 (1898); Brock v. Poor, 216 N.Y. 387, 111 N.E. 229 (915);
Donaldson v. Andresen, 300 Pa. 312, x5o Atl. 616 (930).
s I FLETCHER, PRIVATE COPORATIONS § 25 (perm. ed. 1933); LATTIN, CORPORA-
TIONS 6o (959) 5 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.09 (1958); STEVENS, CORPORA-
TIONS § 15 (2d ed. 1949). For a critical analysis of the Park Terrace case, see Latty,
.4 Conceptualistic Tangle and the One- r-Tcwo Man Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REV. 471
(1956); Note, 34 N.C.L. REV. 531 (1956); Note, 14. WASH. & LEE L. REV. 72 (1957).
See also, Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 496
(1912). See also, BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § X28 (rev. ed. x946), where the gen-
eral rule is accepted, but with some disapproval.6 IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.2 (1949), permits incorporation by one person.
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The plaintiff had a vested right in that liability."'7 By thus attaching
the term "vested" to the liability, the court adopted an alternate basis
for its holding.' This term, however, when used in its constitutional
sense, should be limited to a right so substantial that it cannot be taken
from a party by legislative action without shocking one's sense of justice
and fair play.9 If the plaintiff had dealt with the Pope Realty corpora-
tion in reliance upon the personal liability of its stockholders as security
for the corporate debts, rather than merely happening upon it as a result
of the Park Terrace case, then the right might properly be termed vested
in the constitutional sense.10 The plaintiff, however, had dealt with
Pope Realty as a corporation and did not expect that, in the event of the
corporation's failure, Pope or the other stockholder would personally
assume the corporate obligations.
Both the Park Terrace opinion and the instant opinion are particu-
larly unsatisfactory since, before reaching a decision, the court was aware
of the general rule that the separate entity of a corporation will be dis-
regarded when necessary to prevent an inequitable result." The un-
necessary return to the anachronistic three-stockholders concept placed
a cloud on all transactions of one- or two-man corporations in North
Carolina until the effective date of section 55-3.1. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, by holding Pope personally liable, has adhered dog-
matically to the concept articulated in Park Terrace, that a corporation
cannot exist with less than three stockholders. Consequently, the stock-
holder-directors in the Pope case were held liable for the corporation's
debts when normally the stockholders of a corporation are not liable for
its debts.
One had hoped, before the recent Pope Realty case, that the state-
ment in Park Terrace that legislative intention, as manifested by the
corporation statutes, required three stockholders, would be restricted as
suggested in a recent article.'" By adopting the restriction the court
could have removed itself from a self-created doctrinal dilemma, but
it now appears that the court is taking its previous remarks quite se-
25o N.C. at 568, 1o9 S.E.zd at 266.
' The Park Terrace decision was based on supposed legislative intent. See note 3,
supra. In the instant case, by applying the term "vested," the court transformed the
basis of the holding from legislative intent to a constitutionally protected right.
o Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEXAs L. REV. 231 (1927). See
also, Comment, 34. YALE L.J. 303 (1925).
10Hood v. Richardson Realty, zri N.C. 582, 191 S.E. 410 (-937).
"' Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., z2.x N.C. 473, 480, 85 S.E.zd 677,
681 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
" See Latty, supra note 5.
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riously. With each repetition, however, the unfortunate three-stock-
holders doctrine acquires more strength and stature in North Carolina.
Coupled with the dubious "vested rights" rationale for avoiding appli-
cation of the recent statutory reform, the only solution now seems to be
legislative enactment of a short statute of limitations which will remove
the cloud cast upon the one- and two-man corporation.
